Early in May, while Colin Powell was on his visit to Israel and the Occupied Territories, he met with Mahmoud Abbas, the new Palestinian Prime Minister, and separately with a small group of civil society activists, including Hanan Ashrawi and Mostapha Barghuti. According to Barghuti, Powell expressed surprise and mild consternation at the computerized maps of the settlements, the eight-meter-high fence, and the dozens of Israeli Army checkpoints that have made life so difficult and the future so bleak for Palestinians. Powell's view of Palestinian reality is, to say the least, defective, despite his august position, but he did ask for materials to take away with him and, more important, he reassured the Palestinians that the same effort put in by Bush on Iraq was now going into implementing the road map.
Much the same point was made in the last days of May by Bush himself in the course of interviews he gave to the Arab media, although as usual, he stressed generalities rather than anything specific. He met with the Palestinian and Israeli leaders in Jordan and, earlier, with the major Arab rulers, excluding Syria's Bashar Al-Asaad, of course. All this is part of what now looks like a major American push forward. That Ariel Sharon has accepted the roadmap (with enough reservations to undercut his acceptance) seems to augur well for a viable Palestinian state.
Bush's vision (the word strikes a weird dreamy note in what is meant to be a hard-headed, definitive and three- phased peace plan) is supposed to be achieved by a restructured Authority, the elimination of all violence and incitement against Israelis, and the installation of a government that meets the requirements of Israel and the so-called Quartet (the US, UN, EU and Russia) that authored the plan. Israel for its part undertakes to improve the humanitarian situation, easing restrictions and lifting curfews, though where and when are not specified.
By June 2003, Phase One is also supposed to see the dismantling of the last 60 hilltop settlements (so called "illegal outpost settlements established since March 2001) though nothing is said about removing the others, which account for the 200,000 settlers on the West Bank and Gaza, to say nothing of the 200,000 more in annexed East Jerusalem. Phase Two, described as a transition to run from June to December 2003, is to be focussed, rather oddly, on the "option of creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty" -- none are specified -- culminating in an international conference to approve and then "create" a Palestinian state, once again with "provisional borders". Phase Three is to end the conflict completely, also by way of an international conference whose job it will be to settle the thorniest issues of all: refugees, settlements, Jerusalem, borders. Israel's role in all this is to cooperate; the real onus is placed on the Palestinians, who must keep coming up with the goods in rapid succession, while the military occupation remains more or less in place, though eased in the main areas invaded during the spring of 2002. No monitoring element is envisioned, and the misleading symmetry of the plan's structure leaves Israel very much in charge of what -- if anything -- will happen next. As for Palestinian human rights, at present not so much ignored as suppressed, no specific rectification is written into the plan: apparently it is up to Israel whether to continue as before or not.
For once, say all the usual commentators, Bush is offering real hope for a Middle East settlement. Calculated leaks from the White House have suggested a list of possible sanctions against Israel if Sharon gets too intransigent, but this was quickly denied and then disappeared. An emerging media consensus presents the document's contents -- many of them from earlier peace plans -- as the result of Bush's new-found confidence after his triumph in Iraq. As with most discussions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, manipulated clichés and far-fetched suppositions, rather than the realities of power and lived history, shape the flow of discourse. Sceptics and critics are brushed aside as anti-American, while a sizeable portion of the organised Jewish leadership has denounced the roadmap as requiring far too many Israeli concessions.
But, the establishment press keeps reminding us that Sharon has spoken of an "occupation", which he never conceded until now, and has actually announced his intention to end Israeli rule over 3.5 million Palestinians. But is he even aware of what he proposes to end? The Ha'aretz commentator Gideon Levy wrote on 1 June that, like most Israelis, Sharon knows nothing "about life under curfew in communities that have been under siege for years. What does he know about the humiliation of checkpoints, or about people being forced to travel on gravel and mud roads, at risk to their lives, in order to get a woman in labour to a hospital? About life on the brink of starvation? About a demolished home? About children who see their parents beaten and humiliated in the middle of the night?"
Another chilling omission from the roadmap is the gigantic "separation wall" now being built in the West Bank by Israel: 347 kilometres of concrete running north to south, of which 120 have already been erected. It is 25 feet high and 10 feet thick; its cost is put at 1.6 million dollars per kilometre. The wall doesn't simply divide Israel from a putative Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 lines borders: it actually takes in new tracks of Palestinian land, sometimes five or six kilometres at a stretch. It is surrounded by trenches, electric wire, and moats; there are watchtowers at regular intervals. Almost a decade after the end of South African apartheid, this ghastly racist wall is going up with scarcely a peep from the majority of Israelis or their American allies who, whether they like it or not, are going to pay most of its cost.
The 40,000 Palestinian inhabitants of the town of Qalqilya in their homes are on one side of the wall, the land they farm and actually live off of is on the other. It is estimated that when the wall is finished -- presumably as the US, Israel and the Palestinians argue about procedure for months on end -- almost 300,000 Palestinians will be separated from their land. The roadmap is silent about all this, as it is about Sharon's recent approval of a wall on the eastern side of the West Bank, which will, if built, reduce the amount of Palestinian territory available for Bush's dream state to roughly 40 per cent of the area. This is what Sharon has had in mind all along.
An unstated premise underlies Israel's heavily modified acceptance of the plan and the US's evident commitment to it: the relative success of Palestinian resistance. This is true whether or not one deplores some of its methods, its exorbitant cost, and the heavy toll it has taken on yet another generation of Palestinians who have not wholly given up in the face of the overwhelmingly superiority of Israeli-US power.
All sorts of reasons have been given for the emergence of the roadmap: that 56 per cent Israelis back it, that Sharon has finally bowed to international reality, that Bush needs an Arab-Israeli cover for his military adventures elsewhere, that the Palestinians have finally come to their senses and brought forth Abu Mazen (Abbas's much more familiar nom de guerre, as it were), and so on. Some of this is true, but I still contend that were it not for the fact of the Palestinian stubborn refusal to accept that they are "a defeated people", as the Israeli chief of staff recently described them, there would be no peace plan. Yet, anyone who believes that the roadmap actually offers anything resembling a settlement or that it tackles the basic issues is wrong. Like so much of the prevailing peace discourse, it places the need for restraint and renunciation and sacrifice squarely on Palestinian shoulders, thus denying the density and sheer gravity of Palestinian history. To read through the roadmap is to confront an unsituated document, oblivious of its time and place.
The roadmap, in other words, is not about a plan for peace so much as a plan for pacification: it is about putting an end to Palestine as a problem. Hence the repetition of the term "performance" in the document's wooden prose, -- in other words, how the Palestinians are expected to behave, almost in the social sense of the word. No violence, no protest, more democracy, better leaders and institutions, all based on the notion that the underlying problem has been the ferocity of Palestinian resistance, rather than the occupation that has given rise to it. Nothing comparable is expected of Israel except that the small settlements I spoke of earlier, known as "illegal outposts" (an entirely new classification which suggests that some Israeli implantations on Palestinian land are legal) must be given up and, yes, the major settlements "frozen" but certainly not removed or dismantled. Not a word is said about what since 1948, and then again since 1967, Palestinians have endured at the hands of Israel and the US. Nothing about the de-development of the Palestinian economy as described by the American researcher Sara Roy in a forthcoming book. House demolitions, the uprooting of trees, the 5000 prisoners or more, the policy of targeted assassinations, the closures since 1993, the wholesale ruin of the infrastructure, the incredible number of deaths and maimings -- all that and more, passes without a word.
The truculent aggression and stiff-necked unilateralism of the American and Israeli teams are already well-known. The Palestinian team inspires scarcely any confidence, made up as it is of recycled and aging Arafat cohorts. Indeed, the roadmap seems to have given Yasser Arafat another lease on life, for all the studied efforts by Powell and his assistants to avoid visiting him. Despite the stupid Israeli policy of trying to humble him by shutting him up in a badly bombed compound, he is still in control of things. He remains Palestine's elected president, he has the Palestinian purse strings in his hands (the purse is far from bulging), and as for his status, none of the present "reform" team (who with two or three significant new additions are re-shuffled members of the old team) can match the old man for charisma and power.
Take Abu Mazen for a start. I first met him in March 1977 at my first National Council meeting in Cairo. He gave by far the longest speech, in the didactic manner which he must have first perfected as a secondary school teacher in Qatar, and explained to the assembled Palestinian parliamentarians the differences between Zionism and Zionist dissidence. It was a noteworthy intervention, since most Palestinians had no real notion in those days that Israel was made up not only of fundamentalist Zionists who were anathema to every Arab, but of various kinds of peaceniks and activists as well. In retrospect, Abu Mazen's speech launched the PLO's campaign of meetings, most of them secret, between Palestinians and Israelis who had long dialogues in Europe about peace and some considerable effect in their respective societies on shaping the constituencies that made Oslo possible.
Nevertheless, no one doubted that Arafat had authorised Abu Mazen's speech and the subsequent campaign, which cost brave men like Issam Sartawi and Said Hammami their lives. And while the Palestinian participants emerged from the centre of Palestinian politics (i.e. Fatah), the Israelis were a small marginalised group of reviled peace supporters whose courage was commendable for that very reason. During the PLO's Beirut years between 1971 and 1982, Abu Mazen was stationed in Damascus, but joined the exiled Arafat and his staff in Tunis for the next decade or so. I saw him there several times and was struck by his well-organised office, his quiet bureaucratic manner, and his evident interest in Europe and the United States as arenas where Palestinians could do useful work promoting peace with Israelis. After the Madrid conference in 1991, he was said to have brought together PLO employees and independent intellectuals in Europe and turned them into teams to prepare negotiating files on subjects such as water, refugees, demography, and boundaries in advance of what were to become the secret Oslo meetings of 1992 and 1993, although to the best of my knowledge, none of the files was used, none of the Palestinian experts was directly involved in the talks, and none of the results of this research influenced the final documents that emerged.
In Oslo, the Israelis fielded an array of experts supported by maps, documents, statistics and at least 17 prior drafts of what the Palestinians would end up signing, while the Palestinians unfortunately restricted their negotiators to three completely different PLO men, not one of whom knew English or had a background in international (or any other kind of) negotiation. Arafat's idea seems to have been that he was fielding a team mainly to keep himself in the process, especially after his exit from Beirut and his disastrous decision to side with Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War. If he had other objectives in mind, then he didn't prepare for them effectively, as has always been his style. In Abu Mazen's memoire and in other anecdotal accounts of the Oslo discussions, Arafat's subordinate is credited as the "architect" of the accords, though he never left Tunis; Abu Mazen goes so far as to say that it took him a year after the Washington ceremonies (where he appeared alongside Arafat, Rabin, Peres, and Clinton) to convince Arafat that he hadn't gotten a state from Oslo. Yet, most accounts of the peace talks stress the fact that Arafat was pulling all the strings just the same. No wonder then that the Oslo negotiations made the over-all situation of the Palestinians a good deal worse. The American team led by Dennis Ross, a former Israeli-lobby employee -- a job to which he has now returned -- routinely supported the Israeli position which, after a full decade of negotiation, consisted in handing back 18 per cent of the occupied territories to the Palestinians on highly unfavourable terms, with the IDF left in charge of security, borders, and water. Naturally enough, the number of settlements more than doubled.
Since the PLO's return to the occupied territories in 1994, Abu Mazen has remained a second-rank figure, known universally for his "flexibility" with Israel, his subservience to Arafat, and his total lack of any organised political base, although he is one of Fatah's original founders and a long-standing member and secretary-general of its Central Committee. So far as I know, he has never been elected to anything, and certainly not to the Palestinian Legislative Council. The PLO and the Palestine Authority under Arafat are anything but transparent. Little is known about the way decisions have been made, or how money gets spent, where it is, and who besides Arafat has any say in the matter. Everyone agrees, however, that Arafat, a fiendish micro-manager and control freak, remains the central figure in every significant way. That is why Abu Mazen's elevation to the status of reforming prime minister, which so pleases the Americans and Israelis, is thought of by most Palestinians as, well, a kind of joke, the old man's way of holding on to power by inventing a new gimmick so to speak. Abu Mazen is thought of generally as colourless, moderately corrupt, and without any clear ideas of his own, except that he wants to please the white man.
Like Arafat, Abu Mazen has never lived anywhere except the Gulf, Syria and Lebanon, Tunisia, and now occupied Palestine; he knows no languages other than Arabic, and isn't much of an orator or public presence. By contrast, Mohamed Dahlan, the new security chief from Gaza -- the other much- heralded figure in whom the Israelis and Americans place great hope -- is younger, cleverer, and quite ruthless. During the eight years that he ran one of Arafat's 14 or 15 security organisations, Gaza was known as Dahlanistan. He resigned last year, only to be re-recruited for the job of "unified security chief" by the Europeans, the Americans and the Israelis, even though of course he too has always been one of Arafat's men. Now he is expected to crack down on Hamas and Islamic Jihad; one of the reiterated Israeli demands behind which lies the hope that there will be something resembling a Palestinian civil war, a gleam in the eyes of the Israeli military.
In any event, it seems clear to me that, no matter how assiduously and flexibly Abu Mazen "performs", he is going to be limited by three factors. One of course is Arafat himself, who still controls Fatah, which, in theory, is also Abu Mazen's power base. Another is Sharon (who will presumably have the US behind him all the way). In a list of 14 "remarks" about the roadmap published in Ha'aretz on 27 May, Sharon signalled the very narrow limits on anything that might be construed as flexibility on Israel's part.
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